A Zero-Knowledge PCP (ZK-PCP) is a randomized PCP such that the view of any (perhaps cheating) efficient verifier can be efficiently simulated up to small statistical distance. Kilian, Petrank, and Tardos (STOC '97) constructed ZK-PCPs for all languages in NEXP. Ishai, Mahmoody, and Sahai (TCC '12), motivated by cryptographic applications, revisited the possibility of efficient ZK-PCPs for all L ∈ NP where the PCP is encoded as a polynomial-size circuit that given a query i returns the i th symbol of the PCP. Ishai et al. showed that there is no efficient ZK-PCP for NP with a non-adaptive verifier, who prepares all of its PCP queries before seeing any answers, unless NP ⊆ coAM and polynomial-time hierarchy collapses. The question of whether adaptive verification can lead to efficient ZK-PCPs for NP remained open.
Introduction
Since their inception, interactive proofs [GMR89, BM88] have had a transformative effect on theoretical computer science in general and the foundations of cryptography in particular. In an interactive proof for a language L, a computationally bounded randomized verifier V and an allpowerful prover P are given a common input x, and P tries to convince V that x ∈ L. The proof must be complete: P successfully convinces V that x ∈ L; as well as sound : no cheating prover P should be able to convince V that x ∈ L when x / ∈ L. [GMR89] showed that by allowing interaction and probabilistic verification, nontrivial languages outside of BPP can be proved while the verifier statistically "learns nothing" beyond the fact that x ∈ L. Thus in eyes of the verifier, the interaction remains "zero-knowledge". Shortly after, [GMW91] extend this fundamental result to all of NP based on computational assumptions and a computational variant of the notion of zero-knowledge.
The notion of zero-knowledge is formalized using the simulation paradigm: for each (possibly cheating) efficient verifier, there is an efficient simulator that generates a verifier view that is indistinguishable from the view the verifier would obtain by honestly interacting with the prover, and therefore anything the verifier could do using a transcript of his interaction with the prover, he could do by using the simulator (without talking to the prover). Throughout this paper by default we mean statistical indistinguishability and statistical zero knowledge, namely they must hold against any (possibly computationally inefficient) distinguisher. Any discussion about computational indistinguishability will be made explicit.
Motivated by the goal of unconditional security, Ben-Or et al. [BGKW88] showed that if a verifier V interacts with multiple interactive provers (MIPs) P 1 , P 2 , . . . who may coordinate on a strategy beforehand, but are unable to communicate once the interaction with V starts, then all languages in NP can be proved in a (statistical) zero-knowledge way without any computational assumption. Fortnow, Rompel, and Sipser [FRS94] showed that, the MIP model is essentially equivalent to having a (perhaps exponentially long) proof, whose answers to all possible queries are fixed before interaction begins (in contrast to the usual notion of a prover, who may choose to alter his answers based on the queries he has seen so far). Such proof systems are now known as probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs for short) and have found applications throughout theoretical computer science, notably in the areas of hardness of approximation through the celebrated PCP theorem [BFL90, AS98, ALM + 98] and communication-efficient interactive proofs [Kil92] .
The existence of of ZK proofs for NP in the MIP model [BGKW88] and the "equivalence" of MIP and PCP models (as a proof system) raised the following basic question:
Does NP have PCPs that remain zero-knowledge against malicious verifiers?
The work of [BGKW88] does not resolve this question, because their protocol, when implemented in the PCP model, remains ZK only if cheating verifiers follows the protocol honestly. This highlights an important point: since we have no control over the cheating verifier (except that we assume it is efficient), if the proof is polynomial size then a cheating verifier may read the entire proof and this is not zero knowledge. Therefore, the proof π should be super-polynomially long, and we assume that an efficient (perhaps cheating) verifier V is only allowed black-box access to the proof. Since V is polynomially bounded, having black-box access to such a proof π means that V will be able to query only polynomially many symbols in the proof at will. Thus, by definition, ZK-PCPs are incomparable to standard (statistical) zero knowledge proofs in the single or multi-prover proof systems: (1) the zero knowledge property is harder to achieve in the PCP model because the proof is fixed and there is no control on which queries the verifier chooses to make, (2) but the soundness property may be easier to achieve in the PCP model because the soundness is required only against fixed cheating proofs (rather than cheating provers who may adaptively manipulate their answers).
Kilian, Petrank, and Tardos [KPT97] were the first to explicitly study the question above and (relying on the previous work of [DFK + 92] which in turn relied on the PCP theorem) showed that in fact every language in NEXP has a ZK-PCP. Their ZK-PCPs, however, were not efficient even when constructed for languages in NP, where by an efficient PCP for L ∈ NP, we mean any PCP π whose answer π(q) to any query q can be computed using a polynomial size circuit (which may depend on the common input x ∈ L, a witness w that x ∈ L, and an auxiliary random string r π ). This limitation is inherent in the approach of [KPT97] , since in order to be ZK, their PCP requires more entropy than the number of queries made by any cheating verifier.
Motivated by the lack of progress for over 10 years towards giving ZK-PCPs for NP that are ZK with respect to all efficient cheating verifiers, Ishai, Mahmoody, and Sahai [IMS12] asked whether this may be inherently impossible. Namely, they asked the following question, which is also the main question studied in this work.
Main Question: Are there efficient ZK-PCPs for NP?
Ishai et al. proved that any language or promise problem L with an efficient ZK-PCP where the honest verifier's queries are non-adaptive must satisfy L ∈ coAM. Therefore, NP does not have such efficient ZK-PCPs unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses [BHZ87] . Thus, the main question above remained open whether there exist efficient ZK-PCPs for NP if we allow the verifier to be adaptive. In this paper we resolve this question in the negative; namely we prove:
. Any promise problem L with an efficient ZK-PCP is in SZK.
This strengthens the negative result of [IMS12] in two ways: (1) we lift the restriction that the verifier be non-adaptive, and (2) we can conclude that L ∈ SZK which is stronger than L ∈ AM ∩ coAM, since it is known that SZK ⊆ AM ∩ coAM [For89, AH91] . We emphasize that Theorem 1.1 does not assume that the simulation is black-box.
Relation to Resettable Zero-Knowledge. The notion of resettable zero-knowledge single prover proof systems introduced by Canetti et al. [CGGM00] is comparably stronger than the notion of ZK-PCPs. Essentially, a resettable-ZK proof is a ZK-PCP where soundness is required to hold even against adaptive cheating provers who may manipulate their answers based on the queries they see (rather than just fixed cheating proofs). Canetti et al. [CGGM00] showed how to obtain efficient PCPs that are computational zero-knowledge based on computational hardness assumptions. But recall that in this work, the notion of ZK is statistical, and so their result does not resolve our main question.
Recently, Garg et al. [GOVW12] showed that efficient resettable statistical ZK proof systems exist for non-trivial languages (e.g. Quadratic Residuosity) based on computational assumptions. Therefore under the same assumptions, these languages also possess efficient ZK-PCPs. Garg et al. also showed that assuming the existence of exponentially hard one-way functions, statistical zero-knowledge proof systems can be made resettable. Unfortunately this transformation does not preserve the efficiency of the prover. Therefore, even though by the works of Micciancio, Ong, and Vadhan [MV03, OV08] we know that SZK ∩ NP has statistical zero-knowledge proofs with an efficient prover, the result of [GOVW12] does not necessarily preserve this efficiency.
Finally note that if one can transform any statistical ZK proof into a resettable statistical ZK proof without losing the efficiency of the prover, then together with our main result of Theorem 1.1 this would imply that the problems with efficient ZK-PCPs are exactly those in SZK ∩ NP.
Relation to Basing Cryptography on Tamper-Proof Hardware. A main motivation of [IMS12] to study the possibility of efficient ZK-PCPs for NP comes from a recent line of work on basing cryptography on tamper-proof hardware (e.g. [Kat07,MS08,CGS08,GKR08,GIS + 10, Kol10, GIMS10] ). In this model, the parties can exchange classical bits as well as hardware tokens that hide a stateful or stateless efficient algorithm. The receiver of a hardware token is only able to use it as a black-box and call it polynomially many inputs. Using stateless hardware tokens makes the protocol secure against "resetting" attacks where the receiver of a token is able to reset the state of the token (say, by cutting its power). The work of Goyal et al. [GIMS10] focused on the power and limits of stateless tamper-proof hardware tokens in achieving statistical security and proved that statistical zero-knowledge for all of NP is possible using a single stateless token sent from the prover to the verifier followed by O(1) rounds of classical interaction. A natural question remaining open after the work of [GIMS10] was whether the classical interaction can be eliminated and achieve statistical ZK for NP using only a single stateless token. It is easy to see that this question is in fact equivalent to our main question above, and thus our Theorem 1.1 proves that a single (efficient) stateless token is not sufficient for achieving statistical ZK proofs for NP.
Our Techniques
In this section we describe the ideas and techniques behind the proof of Theorem 1.1 and compare our approach to that of [IMS12] . If L has a ZK-PCP (for now, let us assume for notational simplicity that L is a language; the idea is identical for general promise problems), one naive approach to decide L using its simulator is to run the simulator to obtain a view ν = (r, (q 1 , a 1 ), . . . , (q m , a m )), where r is the random seed of the verifier and the (q i , a i ) are queries/answers to the ZK-PCP, and accept iff ν is an accepting view. This approach would obtain accepting views if x ∈ L due to the zero-knowledge property, but there is no guarantee about the case x ∈ L.
A more promising approach is to "extract" a PCP π from the simulator Sim and run V against π. Using this approach, due to the soundness of the PCP we would obtain a rejecting view if x ∈ L, but the issue shifts to the case x ∈ L and ensuring that the extracted PCP is a valid proof on YES instances. Therefore, a goal could be trying to construct π in a way that it is "close" to an accepting PCP π ← π x,w whenever x ∈ L. To see at a high level why this may be possible for efficient ZK-PCP's, let π x,w denote the true distribution of proofs on an instance x ∈ L. Since the ZK-PCP is efficient, each proof π x,y is computable by some circuit of polynomial size; let η(n) = poly(n) be the number of bits it takes to describe this circuit. If we look at the whole description of π x,w as a random variable, its entropy H(π x,y ) can be at most η. Now consider V [ ] , which is the cheating verifier that executes independent copies of V, all of them accessing the same proof π ← π x,w . Let (ν 1 , . . . , ν ) be the views generated. Since H(π x,w ) ≤ η, if we pick i ← [ ] then the average entropy in the answers returned to the i th verification ν i conditioned on the views of the first i − 1 verifications ν 1 , . . . , ν i−1 is at most η/ , which can be made less than any arbitrarily small polynomial by increasing . Therefore, we will use the simulator for V [ ] to generate views (ν 1 , . . . , ν ), pick i ← [ ] and look at ν i conditioned on (ν 1 , . . . , ν i−1 ). The extracted proof π is defined based on how the queries are answered in ν i . On YES instances π should have low entropy and therefore behave like a fixed accepting proof (because of the statistical indistinguishability of the simulation). On NO instances, π either behaves like a fixed proof and therefore is rejecting (because of soundness), or behaves very different from a fixed proof (which we will be able to detect).
This was the approach used in [IMS12] : they give an AM (i.e. constant-round public-coin) protocol that allows an efficient verifier to extract π using the help of an unbounded prover. We also extract a PCP π from the simulator, but our extracted PCP is defined differently from the one in [IMS12] and this difference allows us to also use it differently: we do not use the prover to help us construct the extracted PCP in the SZK protocol we give for L, but rather we use π only in the analysis to show that the SZK protocol we give is correct.
The Approach of [IMS12]
Let Sim be the simulator for V [ ] . Roughly speaking, [IMS12] defines the PCP π based on the simulator as follows.
In other words, we first sample i ← [ ] and generate views ν 1 , . . . , ν i−1 according to the simulator. Then to answer any query q, we run Sim(x) conditioned on getting q as the first query of the i th execution, then we output the answer Sim(x) gives to q. It may not be possible to sample π(q) efficiently, but [IMS12] show how to sample π through an AM protocol, using the following ideas.
Simulating π with Help of a Prover. Using old and new constant-round sampling and lowerbound protocols [GS89, For89, AH91, GVW01, HMX10] Ishai et al. show an AM protocol using an unbounded (but also untrusted ) prover so that if the prover is honest we get a simulation of the oracle π, and if he cheats then the verifier catches him. Essentially, in the AM protocol, Arthur uses Merlin to help repeatedly rewind the simulator back to the first query. This way, we obtain that L and its complement are both in AM. This approach of [IMS12] is inspired by works of [FF93, BT06, AGGM06] in the context of studing worst-case to average-case reductions in NP where an unbounded prover (Merlin) is forced to simulate a (hard to compute) oracle.
Relying on Nonadaptivity of V. Note that if the distribution of the first and second queries are statistically far, then by asking some second query q 2 from the oracle π we might simply get no answer because it is possible that Sim(x) never generates q 2 as the first query. But if the honest verifier V is nonadaptive, w.l.o.g. we can assume that it randomly permutes its queries before asking them and therefore the marginal distribution of all queries will be identical (though perhaps correlated). [IMS12] show that if the PCP π (as a random variable) has very low entropy, then this implies that the view of V π (x) is close to a simulator-generated view, and so on YES instances by statistical closeness of the simulator and an honest interaction, V π(x) is accepting. On the other hand, since the proof π is generated independently of the final verfication's queries, it holds on NO instances that V π (x) is rejecting because of the soundness of the ZK-PCP.
Our Approach
We use the same cheating verifier V [ ] and its corresponding simulator Sim, but our extracted PCP π is defined without rewinding the simulator back to the first query. Roughly speaking, our oracle is defined as:
Notice that π is defined without rewinding back to the first query, and so we do not require the queries to have the same distribution and thus we do not need to assume the verifier to be nonadaptive. Furthermore, the way we use π differs from [IMS12] because we do not construct π in our SZK protocol, but only use its definition in the analysis of our reduction to SZK.
To obtain an SZK protocol for L, we give a Karp (many-to-one) reduction from L to a problem in SZK. More formally, using the simulator, we map each x to three circuits (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) such that we will be able to verify certain statistical properties about them in SZK (the reduction is given in Reduction 4.2). Essentially, for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, C j runs the simulator for the cheating verifier V [ ] on input x to obtain views (ν 1 , . . . , ν ). Given these executions, C j picks a random execution i and verifies some statistical properties about i th execution conditioned on the first (i − 1) executions.
Here, we just describe the properties that each circuit checks at a high level, and we defer the formal discussions to Section 4. All of the following are conditioned on the first i − 1 views.
1. C 1 checks that the simulated randomness of V in the i th execution is close to uniform.
2. C 2 checks that, sampling a random set of queries and answers for the i th execution and picking one query/answer pair at random, that answer has low entropy given the that query.
3. C 3 checks that the i th execution is accepting.
First we argue that the reduction maps YES instances of L to (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) satisfying all three properties, and NO instances to circuits not satisfying all three properties.
• (x ∈ L). Since the simulator's output is statistically close to the honest distribution, so the simulated verifier's random coins are also close to uniform, and the first property is satisfied. Also, since the PCP is efficient and thus has entropy at most η = poly(n), it means the average conditioned entropy of the answers to queries in the i th verification is at most η/ which we set to be small, so the second property is also satisfied. (Actually, assuming that in the i th execution the entire set of answers has low entropy given the entire set of queries, it is non-trivial to show that a random answer has low entropy given its corresponding query, because the queries may be adaptive and a random query might indirectly reveal information about other queries and answers. Despite that, in Lemma 4.4 we prove this claim even for adaptive verifiers.) Finally, for a YES instance the simulator produces accepting views with high probability, so the third property is also satisfied. This is proved in Section 4.1.
• (x ∈ L). It suffices to show that if (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) satisfy the first two properties, then they do not satisfy the third. If the verifier coins in the simulator's output are close to uniform and there is low entropy in the query-answer pairs, then we can show that the view output by the simulator in the i th execution is statistically close to V i executing against the oracle π defined above. Therefore, the verifier must reject in V i because of the soundness property of the ZK-PCP. This is proved in Section 4.2.
Finally, we note that the desired properties of the circuits C 1 , C 2 can be verified in SZK by two reductions to the problem of Conditional Entropy Approximation (see Definition 3.8) which is known to be SZK-complete [Vad06] , while C 3 can be verified in BPP ⊆ SZK. Since SZK is closed under conjunction, disjunction, and complement (Lemma 3.6, see also [Vad99] ), all three properties can simultaneously be verified in SZK.
Preliminaries
we denote a set of random variables indexed by a set I. We call two ensembles {y x } x∈I and {z x } x∈I with the same index set statistically close if ∆(y x , z x ) = negl(|x|). We use the terms efficient and PPT to refer to any probabilistic polynomial time (perhaps oracle-aided) algorithm. For an oracle π and an (oracle-aided) algorithm V by V π we refer to an execution of V given access to π and by View V π we refer to the view of V in its execution given π which consists of its randomness r and the sequence of its oracle query-answer pairs [(q 1 , a 1 ), (q 2 , a 2 ), . 
Promise Problems
. For promise problems, we will sometimes use x ∈ L to denote x ∈ L Y . Definition 3.1 (Operations on Promise Languages). We define the following three operations over promise languages.
•
• For two promise languages L 1 and L 2 we define their conjunction L = L 1 ∧ L 2 as:
• For two promise languages L 1 and L 2 we define their disjunction L = L 1 ∨ L 2 as:
It is easy to see that
Interactive Proof Systems
Definition 3.3 (PCPs). A (randomized) probabilistically checkable proof (PCP for short) Π = ({π x∈L }, V) for a promise problem L consists of an ensemble of random variables {π x } for x ∈ L whose values are oracles (also called proofs) and also a verifier V which is an oracle-aided PPT with randomness r. We require the following properties to hold.
• Completeness: For every x ∈ L Y and every π ∈ Supp(π x ) it holds that Pr r [V π r (x) = 1] ≥ 2 /3.
• Soundness: If x ∈ L N , then for every oracle π it holds that Pr r [V π r (x) = 0] ≥ 2 /3.
If the PCP also receives an auxiliary input w, the distribution of the oracles might depend on x and w both, denoted as: {π x,w }. We call a PCP for problem L ∈ NP efficient, if for all x ∈ L and witnesses w for x ∈ L, and all x ∈ Supp(π x,w ), there exists a poly(n)-sized circuit C π such that for all queries q, C π (q) = π(q). Namely, C π encodes π.
Notice that this definition of efficiency is non-uniform: the distribution of proofs C π may depend non-uniformly on x, w. This makes our results stronger than if we required C π to depend uniformly on x, w, since we are proving a negative result.
Definition 3.4. Let Π = ({π x∈L,w }, V) be a PCP for the problem L with some auxiliary input given to the oracle. Π is called zero-knowledge (ZK) if for every malicious poly(n)-time verifier V, there exists a simulator Sim which runs in (expected) poly(n)-time and the following ensembles are statistically close:
{Sim(x)} x∈L , {View V πx,w (x) } x∈L .
Note that V only has oracle access to π x,w , the auxiliary input is not given to the simulator and the statistical indistinguishability should hold for large enough x (regardless of the witness w). We call Π perfect ZK if the simulator distribution conditioned on not aborting is identically distributed to the honest interaction.
Since we do not need the exact definition of the class SZK, here we only describe it at a high level. The definition of SZK is indeed very similar to Definition 3.4 with the difference that the soundness holds against provers (which can be thought of as stateful oracles who could answer new queries depending on the previous queries asked.) Definition 3.5 (Complexity Class SZK). The class SZK consists of promise problems which have an interactive proof system with soundness error ≤ 1/3 and the view of any malicious verifier can be simulated up to negl(n) statistical error. Lemma 3.6. For a constant k, let L 1 , . . . , L k be a set of promise languages all in SZK, and let F be a constant-size k-input formula with operations: complement, conjunction, and disjunction as in Definition 3.1. Then
Here we give a sketch of the proof for completeness. (See Section 4.5 and Corollary 6.5.1 of [Vad99] for a more general and improved statement than that of Lemma 3.6.)
Proof Sketch. We will use the following:
Theorem 3.7 ( [Oka96] ). The class SZK is closed under complement.
Since k is constant, we just need to prove the claim for formulas which have only a single operation, and then the lemma follows by an induction. Moreover since L 1 ∨ L 2 = L 1 ∧ L 1 , we just need to prove the claim for complement and conjunction operations. Theorem 3.7 proves this for the complement. To obtain L 1 ∧ L 2 ∈ SZK, given the input (x 1 , x 2 ), the prover provides an (interactive) SZK proof that x 1 ∈ L Y 1 and then (if the first interaction is accepted), he also provides a SZK proof that x 2 ∈ L Y 2 . (More formally, the prover and the verifier start with an amplified version of the original protocols with soundness error < 1/6, the soundness error of the sequential composition in this case remains < 1/3). On the other hand, if either of x 1 ∈ L N 1 , x 2 ∈ L N 2 holds, the corresponding interaction rejects with probability at leat 2/3.
Shannon Entropy and Related Computational Problems
Definition 3.8 (Conditional Entropy Approximation). The promise problem CEA is defined as follows. Suppose C is a poly(n)-size circuit sampling a joint distribution (X, Y). Then given (C, r) we have:
Lemma 3.9. For any > 1/ poly(n), CEA ∈ SZK.
Proof. We give a reduction from CEA to CEA, which is known to be SZK-complete [Vad06] . The reduction maps
where for every i ∈ [1/ ], (X i 1 , X i 2 ) is sampled identically to (X, Y) and independently of all other components (i.e. by an independent copy of the circuit C). It is easy to see that
In our main reduction, we will reduce problems to the following problem in SZK:
Definition 3.10 (Conditional Entropy Bound). CEB α,β is the following promise problem where inputs are poly(n)-size circuits C sampling a joint distribution (X, Y):
The following is immediate from Lemma 3.9:
Lemma 3.11. For all α − β > 1/ poly(n), CEB α,β ∈ SZK.
Useful Facts and Lemmas
Fact 3.12 (Basic Facts about Entropy). The following hold for any random variables X, Y, Z:
3. Data processing inequality: for any randomized function F (whose randomness is independent of X, Y, Z), it holds that I(F(X); Y | Z) ≤ I(X; Y | Z).
In the following, define for ∈ [0, 1] the value H( ) = lg( 1 / ) + (1 − ) lg( 1 /1− ).
Lemma 3.13 (Bounding Statistical Distance from Conditional Entropy
Proof. We use the following definition. Pr [Y=X] ). It can be verified by straightforward calculation that H(X) = n − KL(X, U n ). Pinsker's inequality states that for any random variables x, y, it holds that ∆(x, y) ≤ KL(x, y). Applying Pinsker's inequality to (X | Y ) and U n for every fixed value of Y ← Y and using Jensen's inequality, we have:
To prove this lemma, we need the following: Proof. It is sufficient to show that ∆((X , Y ), Z) ≤ , which is true because the second components have statistical distance at most and the first components have statistical distance zero conditioned on the second components being equal.
Proof of 3.15. We first prove the lemma for the case that Y, Y do not exist (i.e. ∆(X, X ) ≤ ). It is well known that in this case there is a random variable X which has a measure of 1 − in both of X and X . Namely, one can think of a Boolean random variable b jointly distributed with X, X such that Pr[b = 0] = and (X | b = 1) ≡ X ≡ (X | b = 1). Based on this "decomposition" we get:
On the other hand it holds that
Namely, both of H(X), H(X ) are lower-bounded by (1 − ) H(X) an upper-bounded by H( ) + n + (1 − ) H(X), and therefore | H(X) − H(X )| ≤ H( ) + n. Now, using the result above, we prove the conditional case through a hybrid argument. Given the two pairs of random variables (X, Y), (X , Y ) define the hybrid random variable Z = (X , Y) as defined in the statement of Lemma 3.16. We claim that
Using these two bounds, Lemma 3.15 follows by a triangle inequality.
We obtain the first bound as follows.
To obtain the second bound we do as follows.
(Note that the theorem extends beyond efficient ZK-PCP's and encompasses all ZK-PCP's where proofs have low entropy.) In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 4.1. Fix an efficient ZK-PCP for L. Efficiency means there exists η = poly(n) such that every possible honest proof π can be encoded by a circuit with binary description size at most η. This implies that for all x ∈ L with witness w, if we let π x,w be the distribution of proofs defined by the ZK-PCP, it holds that H(π x,w ) ≤ η.
Let
. . , V ) be a verifier who executes independent instances of V against the given oracle and let V i be its i th verification. (We will fix a choice of = poly(n) later.) Let Sim be the simulator that simulates the view of V [ ] statistically well (i.e. Sim(x) is negl(|x|)-close to the view of V [ ] (x) when accessing π x ← π x,w for x ∈ L). The view of V i can be represented as
where r i ∈ {0, 1} k is the randomness used by V i , q i j is its j th oracle query and a i j is the answer to q i j . We use the notation
In order to prove L ∈ SZK, we show how to reduce L to a constant size formula over SZK languages. Roundly speaking, our reduction reduces L to CEB ∧ CEB ∧ D (see Definition 3.1) where D ∈ BPP ⊆ SZK which makes CEB ∧ CEB ∧ D ∈ SZK (see Lemma 3.6). To describe our reduction formally we first need to define a circuit C sim x and a promise problem D α,β as follows.
• The circuit C sim x takes as input r sim (for input length |x|). The circuit C x outputs Sim(x; r sim ) = (ν 1 , . . . , ν ) where
• For α > β, D α,β is a promise problem whose inputs are Boolean circuits C. Suppose the input length of C is n, then:
It is easy to see that for α − β > 1/ poly(n), D α,β ∈ BPP.
Reduction 4.2 (Main Reduction). Given a parameter , we map x → (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) as follows.
1. C 1 is a circuit sampling the joint distribution (X 1 , Y 1 ) defined as follows. On input (r sim , i), C 1 executes the circuit C sim x on a random r sim to get (ν 1 , . . . , ν ) ← C sim x (r sim ) and sets:
2. C 2 is a circuit sampling the joint distribution (X 2 , Y 2 ) defined as follows. On input (r sim , i, j), C 2 executes the circuit C sim x on a random r sim to get (ν 1 , . . . , ν ) ← C sim x (r sim ) and sets:
We emphasize the fact that while a i j , q i j appear in the output of C 2 , the actual index j itself does not appear in the output.
3. C 3 is a circuit computing the following. On input (r sim , i), run C sim x (r sim ) = (ν 1 , . . . , ν ), and output 1 iff ν i is an accepting view of V. Proving Theorem 4.1 using Claim 4.3. By taking = 40mη, it holds that 2m · η/ < 1/20 in Lemma 4.8 and so β < 1/2, which implies that D α,β ∈ BPP, Z ∈ SZK, and so L ∈ SZK.
In the following we prove Claim 4.3 by studying each cases of x ∈ L Y and x ∈ L N separately. We begin with a lemma that will be useful for the case x ∈ L.
The following lemma bounds the conditional entropy of a single answer to a single randomly chosen verifier query by the conditional entropy of the set of all answers to the set of all verifier queries. This is non-trivial because the verifier queries may be asked adaptively.
Lemma 4.4. Let A be any randomized algorithm that (adaptively) queries a PCP π. Let r ∈ {0, 1} k denote the random coins of A. Let q = (q 1 , . . . , q m ) be the queries that A π (r) makes and let a j = π(q j ) be the corresponding answers. Let π be an arbitrary distribution over proofs, and let q and a be the distribution over (the vectors of ) queries and answers obtained by querying π using algorithm A on uniform random coins r. Let also j be an arbitrary distribution over [m] .
Then H(a j | q j ) ≤ H(a | r) where in the notation q j the value of j is not explicitly revealed.
Proof. By the definition of conditional entropy and adding 0 = H(a j q j | π) − H(a j q j | π), we get
Since a proof π is stateless for any fixed π, given any query q asked at some point during the execution of A π , the answer a = π(q) is also fixed. Therefore it holds that H(a j q j | π) = H(q j | π), and by the definition of mutual information, we may deduce that H(a j | q j ) = I(a j q j ; π) − I(q j ; π) ≤ I(a j q j ; π).
Since I(a j q j ; π) = H(π) − H(π | a j q j ) and since π and r are independent, Item 1 of Fact 3.12 implies that
Let F be the function that takes as input (a, q) and outputs (a j , q j ) by sampling j. By the data processing inequality (Item 3 of Fact 3.12) it holds that
Finally, since H(q | ar) = 0, this implies the proposition.
Remark 4.5. We emphasize that if π was stateful (i.e. a "prover", rather than a "proof"), then Lemma 4.4 would be false. Even a deterministic prover can correlate his answers to the verifier's queries, and so it may be that H(a | q) = 0 but H(a j | q j ) > 0. Namely, even given π (say for a stateful prover that π gives the random coins of the prover) and a query q, the answer to q may have entropy because π's answer to q may be different depending on whether q was asked as the first query or second query or third query, etc. In particular, the equality H(a j q j | π) = H(q j | π) used in the proof of Lemma 4.4 would not hold anymore. This is one place where we crucially use the fixed nature of a PCP.
Proof of Claim 4.3: the Case x ∈ L Y
Here we would like to show that (
. We study each of the generated instances C i for i ∈ [3]. In all these cases, we first assume that the simulator's output is identically distributed to the view of V [ ] interacting with a prover and then will show how remove this assumption.
The Instance C 1 . If the simulator's outputs were identically distributed to the view of V [ ] interacting with a prover, then the simulated randomness X 1 = r i will be uniformly distributed over {0, 1} k with entropy k independently of Y 1 = (ν 1 , . . . , ν i−1 ). Since the simulator generates a view that is statistically close to the honest interaction (and since k = poly(|x|) and H(negl(n)) = negl(n)) we may apply Lemma 3.15 to deduce that H(
The Instance C 2 . Fix an arbitrary witness w of x ∈ L, and we study the view of V [ ] while interacting with a proof generated according to the distribution π x,w whose entropy is bounded by η. Suppose first that the simulator's outputs were identically distributed to the view of V [ ] interacting with π x,w . In this case, by an argument similar to [IMS12] , one can show that
(π x,w and r 1 , . . . , r are independent) = H(π x,w , r 1 , . . . , r ) (π x,w and r 1 , . . . , r determine ν 1 , . . . ,
Therefore, by averaging over i we obtain that
The following claim is also based on the assumption that the simulation is perfect, and thus the distribution of (ν 1 , . . . , ν m ) generated by the simulator is identical to the view of V [ ] run against π ← π x∈L,w .
Claim 4.7. For each fixed value of i and (ν 1 , . . . , ν i−1 ), it holds that
Namely, the entropy of the answers of the i th verification gives an upper-bound on the entropy of the answer to a randomly chosen query of the verifier without revealing its index.
Proof. Let (π x,w , ν 1 , . . . , ν i−1 ) be the joint distribution of an honest proof π x,w and i−1 executions of the honest verifier V 1 , . . . , V i−1 using proof π x,w . Apply Lemma 4.4 using the distribution over proofs given by (π x,w | ν 1 , . . . , ν i−1 ), and with the honest verifier algorithm V i as the query algorithm accessing the proof.
Using Claims 4.6 and 4.7, we conclude that H(X 2 | Y 2 ) ≤ η/ , assuming that the simulator was perfect. If we only assume that the simulator's output is statistically close to the view of V [ ] interacting with π x,w , then we can apply Lemma 3.15 and deduce that H(X 2 | Y 2 ) ≤ η/ +negl(n) < 1.1η/ which implies that C 2 ∈ CEB Y 2η/ ,1.1η/ .
The Instance C 3 . By the completeness of Π, when V [ ] = (V 1 , . . . , V ) interacts with a proof, for all i ∈ [ ], V i accepts with probability ≥ 2/3. Since the simulation is statistically close to the real interaction, it holds that ν i is accepting with probability 2/3 − negl(n) ≥ 0.66, and so C 3 ∈ D Y 0.66,β .
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N
). This follows from the following lemma. Intuition. Since C 2 ∈ CEB N 2η/ ,1.1η/ , therefore, the oracle answers returned to the verifier in the i th execution (for a random i ← [ ]) all have very low entropy and thus close to a fixed proof. Moreover, due to C 1 ∈ CEB N k− 1 /200,k− 1 /100 , the randomness of verifier in this execution has almost full entropy, and therefore, the i th execution is close to an honest execution of the verifier against some oracle. Finally, since x ∈ L N by the soundness of the PCP, the verifier would accept with probability at most ≈ 1/3. The formal argument goes through a hybrid argument as follows.
Experiments. The outputs of all experiments described below consist of a view of V [i] (i.e. the first i executions of the verifier). The distribution of (ν 1 , . . . , ν i−1 ) in all of these executions is the same and is sampled by Sim(x), and they only differ in the way they sample ν i .
• Experiment Real. Choose i ← [ ], and take the output (ν 1 , . . . , ν i ) by running Sim(x).
• Experiment Ideal. Choose i ← [ ], and take the output (ν 1 , . . . , ν i−1 ) by running Sim(x).
To sample ν i = (r i , q i , a i ) we first sample r i ← {0, 1} k uniformly at random, and then using r i we run the verifier against the oracle π defined as follows.
The Oracle π: Suppose we have fixed (ν i , . . . , ν i−1 ). Recall the distribution ((q i j , a i j ) | ν i , . . . , ν i−1 ) defined above when defining the instance C 2 (i.e., (a i j , q i j ) is a randomly chosen pair of query-answer pairs from the view ν i without revealing the index j). For every query q, the oracle π gets one sample according to a ← (a i j | ν i , . . . , ν i−1 , q i j = q) and sets π(q) = a forever. If Pr[q i j = q | ν i , . . . , ν i−1 ] = 0, we define π(q) = ⊥.
• Experiment Hyb j for j ∈ [m + 1]. These experiments are in between Real and Ideal and for larger j they become closer to Real. Here we choose i ← [ ], and take the output (ν 1 , . . . , ν i ) by running Sim(x). Then we will re-sample parts of ν i as follows. We will keep (r i , (q i 1 , a i 1 ), . . . , (q i j−1 , a i j−1 )) as sampled by Sim(x). For the remaining queries and answers we sample an oracle π as described in Ideal, and we let (q i j , a i j ), . . . , (q i m , a i m ) be the result of continuing the execution of V i using r i and the oracle π. Note that Hyb m+1 ≡ Real. ∆(Hyb j , Hyb j+1 ) ≤ 1/3 + 1/10 + 2mη/ which proves that C 3 ∈ D N 2/3,β . In the following we prove these claims.
Proof of Claim 4.9. Since the oracle π is sampled and fixed before choosing r i and executing V i , and because x ∈ L N , by the soundness property of the PCP it holds that Pr Ideal [ν i accepts ] ≤ 1/3. But note that the only difference between Ideal and Hyb 1 is the way we sample r i conditioned on the previously sampled parts (i.e. ν 1 , . . . , ν i−1 ). Thus it holds that ∆(Ideal, Hyb 1 ) ≤ 1/10.
Proof of Claim 4.11. The only difference between Hyb j and Hyb j+1 is the way they answer q i j . In Hyb j+1 the original answer of the simulator is used, while in Hyb j this answer is provided by the oracle π. Thus, they are different only when the answer re-sampled by π differs from the original answer. Therefore, we have that:
∆(Hyb j , Hyb j+1 ) ≤ E 
